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Immigration or Alienage?
How States Can Legislate to Protect Undocumented
Agricultural Workers
Adam Hutchinson*
INTRODUCTION
Although the percentage of the American economy
contributed to agriculture has declined in the past few decades, the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) reported that
the agricultural sector generated more than $400 billion gross
income in 2 0 17 .1 Similarly, the USDA's Economic Research
Services (ERS) estimates that American agriculture employs more
than one million people annually.2 Of those one million
agricultural workers, the ERS further estimates that more than
780,000 are foreign-born.3 Finally, the ERS approximates 528,000
foreign-born crop workers have no official legal status in the
United States.4 From examining these statistics alone, it is clear
that a large-scale drop in the number of foreign-born agricultural
workers would cause major disruptions in America's agricultural
economy.5 Further, such a disruption will disproportionally affect
rural states like Kentucky, whose economy is heavily agricultural.
6
*Soliciting Articles Editor, KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L.; B.A. 2005,
Transylvania University; J.D., expected May 2019, University of Kentucky College of Law.
'Gross Cash Farm Income Forecast o Stabilize in 2018, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.
ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/gallery/chart-
detaill?chartId=76943 [http://perma.cclPUT6-TPK3].
2 Immigration and the Rural Workforce, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc. ECON. RES. SERV.,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/newsroom/trending-topics/immigration-and-the-rural-workforce/
[https://perma.cc/JDY4-LMKS].
IId.
4 Id.
See STEVEN ZAHNISER, TOM HERTZ, PETER DIXON & MAUREEN RIMMER,
Economic Research Service Report Summary, USDA (May 2012),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/44981/
20515_errl35reportsummary_1_.p
df?v-41219 [http://perma.cc/2479-68XW1.
G It is estimated that Kentucky agriculture produced $5,400,000,000 in sales in
2016, which is itself down slightly from previous years. This translates to around
$1,200,000,000 net income for Kentucky agriculture during 2016. See UNIV. OF KY. COLL.
OF AGRIC., FOOD AND ENV'T, 2016-2017 KENTUCKY AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC SITUATION
AND OUTLOOK, (Erica Rogers ed.),
http://www.uky.edulAg/AgEcon/pubs/extoutlookl61758.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW8Y-4L56].
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While few concrete legislative steps have been taken by the
current Congress, rolling back the number of undocumented
foreign-born persons in the United States has been a key theme for
President Donald Trump's administration.7 Therefore, states may
be interested in how far they can legislate to protect undocumented
immigrants from incursion by federal officials, and what sorts of
power the federal government may exercise to compel states to
enforce federal immigration policy.8 While states whose economies
are especially dependent on agriculture may be substantially
interested in protecting their undocumented population from
incarceration or deportation, every state should seek to ensure
their non-residents are treated equitably. That individual states
may have interests that differ from federal policy, however, is
nothing new.9 The entire system of cooperative federalism is built
upon the notion that states can function as laboratories of
democracy.1 0 That is to say, while an individual state may not
directly contravene federal legislation or itself legislate in areas
exclusively reserved for the federal government, it may try policy
approaches to a variety of activities that have not been exclusively
set aside for the federal government." With particular respect to
immigration, this policy approach is typically called "immigration
federalism."1 2
Recently, Stella Burch Elias defined immigration
federalism broadly as "the engagement by national, state, and local
governmental actors in immigration regulation."13 This definition
is distinct from more narrow ones, which tend to view a state's role
7 Jeremy Diamond & Sara Murray, Trump Outlines Immigration Specifics, CNN
(Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/16/politics/donald-trump-immigration-plans/
[https://perma.cclBTF8-LTMJI.
8 See Tal Kopan, What are sanctuary cities, and can they be defunded?, CNN
(March 26, 2018, 3:40 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politcs/sanctuary-cities-
explainedlindex.html [http://perma.cc/T44R-AHGP].
9 Id.
'o See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 287-92 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
Dissenting) (demonstrating how the Oklahoma legislature operated as a laboratory for
democracy by implementing policy approaches to go around the federal government when
federal legislation caused unreasonable or arbitrary interference and restrictions on states
and their citizens).
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 570 (2008).
'3 Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703,
710-11 (2013).
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in immigration as merely an enforcement mechanism used to
further the federal immigration policy. 14 Elias, however, asserts
that a state's capability to engage in immigration exceeds the
promotion of the federal policy; such that states have a certain
range of freedom to craft their own particular policies on
alienage.1 5 For example, with respect to a state's concern of
undocumented agricultural workers' status, the state could
effectuate legislation or policies-or both-effectively protecting
such workers from potential mass deportation.16
As a matter of law, however, the precise ability of states to
ensure the continued availability of their undocumented, foreign-
born agricultural workers is unclear. The federal government
enjoys undoubted power over immigration and the status of
undocumented immigrants, which emanates from its power to
"establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,"
1 7 as well as its
power to conduct national foreign policy.1 8 Further, Congress has
already heavily legislated the field with the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).19 In general, states' authority to
legislate where Congress possesses inherent powers or has already
occupied the legislative field is slim to none.20
Further, after the United States Supreme Court decided
that the federal government substantially occupied the field of
immigration law in cases such as Arizona v. United States, it is
unclear what space is left for the states to legislate. As the Court
noted, "The framework enacted by Congress leads to the conclusion
here . . . that the Federal Government has occupied the field of
alien registration."2 1  Therefore, many contemporary
commentators on immigration law consider the field to be
completely occupied by Congress.2 2 If this contention proves
See id. (discussing that states have played various roles in immigration
federalism, including acting under the supervision of the federal government or
concurrently with the federal government to implement immigration policy).
16 See id.
16 See id. at 736.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 4.
18 See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982).
1' See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148 (2002).
20 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
21 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012).
- See Elias, supra note 13, at 705.
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correct, there is little room for something like the broad sense of
immigration federalism for which Elias argues.23
The argument of this Note, however, is that while the
available scope of legitimate state power to shape immigration
policy may be narrow, the effects of such policy could enhance the
efforts of states to ensure the equitable and fair treatment of non-
residents and the continued economic productivity of many state
economies. This Note defends the thesis that there is still
considerable scope for states to shape immigration policy without
running afoul of the federal field. In particular, this Note argues
that the traditional immigration jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court has made a distinction between immigration law-which it
has understood as a power reserved exclusively for the federal
government-and alienage law, which emerges from police power
of the states but may also be exercised by the federal government.24
While immigration law controls the admission, qualifications, and
expulsion of non-residents, alienage law itself refers to laws
exclusively affecting undocumented persons in any capacity other
than their immigration status. So, for example, state laws limiting
undocumented individuals from seeking employment or requiring
them to comply with certain documentation procedures are
alienage laws, not immigration laws.
This Note argues that the distinction between alienage law
and immigration law presents a fertile legal ground for states
wishing to protect their population of undocumented individuals
from incarceration and deportation. In particular, this Note will
defend an interpretation of Arizona v. United States that
emphasizes the silence of the Court on specific matters: the power
of the states to work on the margins of the IRCA and other federal
immigration legislation. In particular, the Note argues that
Arizona may reassert federal primacy in immigration law, but it
actually expands the scope of state alienage laws. In Arizona, the
Court muddles the distinction between alienage and immigration
law in a manner that may effectively expand the power of states to
successfully legislate on issues that have often fallen into the
cracks between the two--especially with respect to establishing
23 Id at 710.
24 See U.S. CONsT. amend. X; see also Arizona, 567 U.S. at 441. But see U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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facets of state law specifically designed for non-residents. One new
development in this area that must be addressed is the power of
sub-federal jurisdictions to enact laws concerning undocumented
persons by creating "sanctuary" jurisdictions. Here, this Note
offers no opinion regarding the sanctuary jurisdiction
phenomenon. However, it is illustrative of how difficult it is for the
federal government to compel sub-federal jurisdictions to enforce
federal law.
The Supreme Court has developed a rich jurisprudence
detailing when and where the federal government may deploy its
power over spending. This Note argues that while Congress may
attempt to persuade states to enforce federal rules and regulations
through their spending power-by, for example, attaching a
certain percentage of federal highway funds to a state's willingness
to set the drinking age at twenty-one2 5-attaching onerous
conditions to funds with the goal of preventing states from
exercising their police powers may be considered too coercive by
courts.2 6 Therefore, states wishing to protect undocumented
individuals from the vagaries of federal immigration policy have
little to fear from Congress, so long as they steer clear of the areas
clearly preempted according to Arizona.
While this Note does contend that states possess more
power than ever to legislate on issues dealing with undocumented
immigrants, they must also be careful not to enact alienage laws
putting them into direct conflict with federal immigration law.
This means that states must be mindful of federal preemption on
two fronts. First, they must be mindful that their alienage laws do
not actually become immigration laws subject to preemption by
federal immigration law. Second, even state legislation that clearly
falls into the category of alienage law must be careful to comply
with both state and federal law-whether alienage or
immigration-if possible. If a state alienage law makes compliance
with an applicable federal immigration law impossible, it will
- See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
26 See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (making
clear that while the federal government can tie some federal funding to a state's compliance
with a federal regulation or policy, "the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the
ability simply to compel the States."); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519,
578 (2012) (holding that permitting the Federal Government to force the States to
implement a federal program would threaten the political accountability key to the federal
system).
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likely be preempted. Therefore, it is not enough that states hew
closely to alienage laws; they must make sure their alienage laws
allow for compliance with federal immigration law. Moreover,
whether such compliance is even possible will depend upon how we
understand federal preemption jurisprudence.
To make this argument, this Note offers a characterization
and defense of contemporary federal preemption jurisprudence.
This Note will argue that federal preemption doctrine rarely
occupies an entire legislative field-forcing out all possible state
legislation and that this is especially true in fields that
traditionally fall within a state's police powers to monitor and
promote the health and welfare of their citizens. Finally, with the
abovementioned view of federal preemption in mind, this Note will
recommend that states wishing to protect non-residents stay
within the ambit of those traditional police powers.27 Therefore, it
will argue that if agriculturally rich states wish to protect their
undocumented workers, they should adopt a legislative strategy
centering around shrinking the contact foreign-born workers have
with federal police forces. In particular, interested states should
seek to enact legislation providing for the health and welfare of
undocumented immigrants in a variety of ways, including
legislation that allows them greater access to local health services
and workplace protections.
Part I of this note offers a general outline and
interpretation of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence surrounding
the federal preemption of state laws. Part II distinguishes between
laws concerning immigration and laws concerning alienage. Since
states can legislate on alienage but are probably preempted by
federal law on immigration, this section will seek to offer a clear
description of the boundary between the two. Further, this
discussion will pay particularly close attention to the Supreme
Court's decision in Arizona. This case outlines the most recent and,
therefore, most useful boundary between alienage and
immigration. This section will conclude that Arizona actually
grants states wide latitude to enact legislation concerning non-
resident immigrants.
27 Developments in the Law -Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 126
HARv. L. REV. 1565, 1597, 1610-11 (2013).
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Part III briefly discusses the phenomenon of "sanctuary
jurisdictions"-legal jurisdictions in which local officials choose not
to cooperate with some federal immigration policies. Sanctuary
jurisdictions are deeply controversial both legally and politically.28
Given the Supreme Court's views on the use of the government's
"Spending Power," federal officials and agencies will have a
difficult time forcing such jurisdictions to comply with federal
immigration policy. This protection will likely transfer to
jurisdictions wishing to take a more active role in protecting their
undocumented populations. Finally, Part IV makes a series of
policy recommendations for agriculturally rich jurisdictions
wishing to offer legal protection to undocumented workers.
I. THE FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE
The so-called "Supremacy Clause" of the U.S. Constitution
explains that federal laws "shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."2 9 Consequently, any state or local laws standing
in direct opposition to a federally enacted law or regulation30-or
ruling by the United States Supreme Court-are invalidated and
not legally enforceable. The process by which a federal rule
displaces a contrary rule from a lower jurisdiction is called federal
preemption. While there are constitutional limits placed on the
rules the federal government may formulate and enact, as long as
it acts within its constitutional sphere, its pronouncements reign
supreme over competing state rules.3 1
In general, there are different ways that Congress may
preempt a contrary state or local law. First, Congress may "occupy
a given field" of law or regulation, making it impossible for any
- See, e.g., Hailey Branson-Potts, Federal Judge Blocks Implementation of
Controversial Texas Law Banning 'Sanctuary Cities, L.A. TiMES, (Aug. 30, 2017, 9:25 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-texas-sanctuary-cities-judge-20 17 830-story.html
[https://perma.ccl3FPZ-TE8Q].
2 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
: Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
3 See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759
(1982) (explaining that the "Federal Government may displace state regulation" when such
displacement is a valid exercise of Congressional commerce authority).
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other jurisdiction to exercise any legal power within it.32 That is if
Congress has expressed an intent that a whole field of law or
regulation should be governed exclusively by federal power, then
any law passed in that field outside of federal law is nullified,
absent any other constitutional limitation.33 This remains true
even if a particular competing state or local law does not directly
contravene a federal rule.3 4 For instance, in Pacific Gas & Electric
Company v. State Energy Resource Conservation & Development
Commission the Court in discussing the history of the Atomic
Energy Act explained that "Congress. . . intended that the federal
government should regulate the radiological safety aspects
involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant."3 5
From this, the Court concluded that "the Federal Government has
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the
limited powers expressly ceded to the States."3 6 Thus, the Court
held that Congress had exercised its preemptive authority such
that any state or local rules-whether expressly contrary to federal
policy or speaking to an area of nuclear safety on which the Atomic
Energy Act was silent-were preempted.37 As one may gather,
when Congress decides to occupy a field, any state or local
legislation in that field is automatically invalidated, even if such
state or local legislation concerns a specific sub-area Congress did
not expressly address.
Congress may also choose to occupy only a portion of a given
legislative field. Moreover, it may preempt state or local
governments from offering a contrary rule concerning an issue.38
In such a situation, the Court typically reasons that if Congress
only exhibits intent to set certain rules for a given field, but not to
wholly occupy it, then state and local governments are free to
legislate so long as that legislation is not contrary to any stated
federal rule.39 Further, state and local regulation must not make it
32See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248.
33Id.
34Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Com'n., 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983) ("Even where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a
specific area, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts.").
- Id. at 205.
3 Id. at 212.
n Id. at 212-13 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947)).
` See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 613-14 (1991).
3 Id. at 613.
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"impossible" to comply with federal regulation in the same field.
The Court has explained that "[ilf Congress has not entirely
displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state law is
still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law,
that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal
law ... "40 If Congress has decided only to preempt particular issues
within a given field, state and local governments are free to
legislate so long as their legislation does not make it impossible or
stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."41 Generally, if state or local law does
not conflict with federal law by making compliance with both the
federal provision(s) a "physical impossibility," 42 or by "standling]
as an obstacle to the accomplishment" of Congressional
objectives,43 conflict preemption is not implicated.
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that not only substantive
laws can be preempted by federal legislation, but also certain
methods of complying with a given federal law.4 4 While a sub-
federal jurisdiction may not directly legislate in a preempted field
or on a preempted issue, its actions will still be preempted if they
attempt to enforce a federal rule in a manner that is not consistent
with the purposes of such rule.4 5 The Court has stated that
"[clonflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system
Congress erected as conflict over overt policy."
4 6 Therefore, even
when a state or local jurisdiction attempts to enforce a federal law
or regulation, its particular method or "technique" of enforcement
may be preempted if it somehow conflicts with the federal
enforcement policy. For example, this may occur when a state or
local jurisdiction attempts to use criminal penalties to enforce a
federal policy that is typically a matter of civil law.
4 7
40 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
41 Id.
42 Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 204 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963)).
3 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowtiz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
44 See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. And Motor Coach Emp. of America
v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
4 Id. at 286-87.
16 Id. at 287.
47 This is the basis that the Arizona Court used to invalidate one particular
provision of the Arizona alienage laws in question. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387,
406-07 (2012).
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In the context of immigration law, the pre-emptive power of
Congress in the eyes of the court becomes the key issue. That is to
say, does Congress completely occupy the field so as to exclude any
state or local legislation or, alternatively, does the Court view
Congress as having only reserved the right to preempt state and
local legislation on particular issues within the field of
immigration?
The U.S. Constitution grants the federal government broad
latitude to promulgate immigration law.4 This was not only
because courts recognized that the federal government was
constitutionally authorized "[tlo establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization,"4 9 but also because it was thought to be within the
natural powers of nation-states to control their borders and
regulate those who wished to cross them.5 0 Thus, in Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, the Court held that Congress had near
absolute authority to prevent the admission or order the expulsion
of any noncitizens because this power is "incident of every
independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not
exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of
another power."5 1 The Supreme Court's immigration jurisprudence
then is based not only on constitutional commands but also on a
prevailing political theory concerning the rights of a sovereign and
independent nation state.52 The Court views immigration controls
through the lens of foreign policy and state self-sovereignty; it
should come as no surprise then that it would view the federal
government as having plenary power over it.6 The assertion of
political theory into the heart of the Court's constitutional
understanding of the federal government's vast immigration
powers should not be dismissed as merely a Nineteenth Century
curiosity, however.54 As we shall see below, the notion that the
federal government enjoys plenary power over immigration as an
4 See generally Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
- U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
5o Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893).
51 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603-04.
52 See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711 ("The right to exclude or to expel all aliens,
or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, being an
inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its
safety, its independence, and its welfare....").
53 But see Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-
Sovereignties, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 121, 122 (1994).
54 Id. at 123-24.
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extension of its absolute power over foreign policy figures heavily
into the Court's contemporary immigration jurisprudence.
In exercise of its plenary power over immigration, Congress
is free to set standards with respect to border admittance and
deportation procedures.5 5 State and local governments lack this
power.56 Kentucky may not set standards of admission or expulsion
for undocumented persons any more than it may commission its
own military.5 7 However, the Court has also traditionally set aside
an area of law that both federal and sub-federal governments can
legislate in with only direct federal preemption on conflicting
issues.5 8 This field is alienage law.5 9 While immigration law
broadly governs the standards for admission and expulsion of
illegal immigrants from the United States, alienage law sets legal
standards that illegal immigrants must comply with, such as
cooperating with police officers who attempt to verify their
immigration status upon arrest.6 0 As explored in Part II, while
state and local governments may not directly address the field of
immigration, the Court appears to be quite deferential toward its
ability to broadly legislate on issues of alienage.
II. IMMIGRATION AND ALIENAGE LAW
A. Traditional Alienage Law Jurisprudence
The Court has recognized that the political authority of the
United States is not exhausted by the powers of the federal
government; the constitutional powers of the governments of the
several states must also be considered. While it is clear that under
the Court's immigration jurisprudence admission or deportation of
undocumented immigrants is exclusively of federal concern,
61 it
has carved out a separate space to deal with issues of alienage.
51 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012).
6 Id. at 395.
57 Tamra M. Boyd, Keeping the Constitution's Promise: An Argument for Greater
Judicial Scrutiny ofFederal Alienage Classifications, 54 STAN. L. REV. 319, 322 (2001).
5 See id. at 320.
5 Id.
6o Arizona, 567 U.S. at 414.
61 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) ("The passage of laws which
concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to
Congress, and not to the States.").
4012018-2019]
402 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 11 No. 2
Alienage laws are those that govern the rights of immigrants.62
Further, alienage laws cannot encroach upon the power of the
federal government to admit or deport undocumented persons. If
such laws do impinge on the federal government's power over
immigration, courts would likely view such laws as preempted.63
For instance, laws that restrict the ability of employers to hire
undocumented immigrants are, properly speaking, alienage laws
and not immigration laws.64 Finally, since such laws do not
actually affect the federal government's inherent power over
immigration or interfere with foreign policy, courts have typically
not viewed them as preempted by federal immigration law.65
Alienage laws can be enacted at any level of government.6 6
Often, the effect of such laws has disadvantaged non-resident
immigrants in some respects, from employment opportunities to
housing options. However, the Supreme Court has long held that
undocumented or illegal immigrants are "persons" for the purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause, thereby subsequently invalidating
a plethora of discriminatory laws.67 Additionally, the Supreme
Court has been unclear on the question of whether alienage itself
should be considered a "suspect class" for the purposes of equal
protection.68 Recently, courts have shied away from designating
alienage as a characteristic which creates a suspect class.6 9
Interestingly, in an attempt to resolve whether states are
allowed to discriminate on the basis of alienage, the Court defined
the immigration powers of the federal government in a way that
explicitly makes room for the alienage powers often exercised by
the states. In Torao Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, the
Supreme Court held that California could not deny the plaintiff a
boating license because he was a non-resident, writing that "[tihe
Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in
determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States,
62Victor C. Romero, Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal
Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications after Adanrand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 76 OR. L. REV. 425, 427 (1997).
3 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399.
6 See Romero, supra note 62.
6-See Boyd, supra note 57, at 320.
661d.
67 Id. at 321.
6 Id. at 337.
6 Id. at 322-23.
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the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before
naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their
naturalization."70 Here, the Court views the role of the federal
government in immigration policy as setting standards for
naturalization or "legislating the selection, admission, and
exclusion of noncitizens."7 1 The distinction between the exclusive
power of the federal government over immigration and the shared
power of state governments over alienage has been an essential
part of the Court's immigration jurisprudence. This distinction was
called into question by Arizona v. United States.
B. The Status ofAlienage Law Since Arizona
In 2012, the Supreme Court called into question the long-
settled distinction between immigration and alienage laws in
Arizona v. United States. Arizona had enacted four separate
statutes that the federal government argued were preempted by
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.72 The four
provisions in contention were: (1) a statutory command that an
officer must make a "reasonable attempt" to ascertain the
immigration status of anyone that they may stop, detain, or arrest
on some "legitimate basis," as well necessitating the determination
of an arrestee's immigration status before release;73 (2) the
creation of a misdemeanor for any persons found not to be carrying
their "alien registration document" as commanded by 8 U.S.C. §§
1304(e), 1306(a);74 (3) the creation of a misdemeanor for any "alien"
to "knowingly" apply, solicit work in a public place, or perform
work as an employee or an independent contractor;7 5 and (4)
statutory permission to any state police officer or sheriff to arrest
anyone who commits an act the officer believes makes that person
deportable.76
In particular, provisions (2) and (4) were especially
controversial. In order to determine the legal residency of an
arrestee or even detainees, Arizona established its state
70 Torao Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
7' Elias, supra note 13, at 711.
72 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 393 (2012).
73 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (Supp. 2012).
74 Id. § 13-1509 (Supp. 2012).
75 Id. § 13-2928(C), (F).
76 Id. § 13-3883(A)(5).
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immigration database, which the federal government argued was
in direct conflict with its database.7 7 Moreover, provision (4)
granted state police and sheriffs the power to arrest persons for
actions they believed might make them deportable.7 8 This power
gave rise to accusations of racial profiling because-given
Arizona's location adjacent to the Mexican border-the officers'
judgments as to who was deportable would be made mostly on the
basis of skin color.79 All four provisions were called into question
for their status as immigration and not alienage laws.8 0 As we have
seen, while states may engage in alienage lawmaking,
immigration lawmaking is the exclusive domain of the federal
government.8 ' Therefore, if Arizona did attempt to regulate or
create rules concerning immigration, then the Supreme Court's
traditional immigration jurisprudence would view Arizona's laws
as preempted.82 Both the U.S. District Court for Arizona and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit viewed Arizona's laws as
immigration and not alienage, therefore enjoining them as
preempted by federal immigration law.8 3
Interestingly, the Supreme Court found that three of the
four provisions were preempted by federal immigration law.84
However, the Court held that provision (2), which created a
misdemeanor for an immigrant not in possession of their
registration documents, was not preempted.85 In line with its
traditional immigration jurisprudence, the Court held that the
federal government had near plenary power to regulate
immigration not only because of its constitutional mandate to set
rules for naturalization but also because "the dynamic nature of
relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to
ensure enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation's
7 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400.
78 Alex Lach, The Top 5 Reasons Why S.B. 1070 Damages America, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGREsS (June 25, 2012, 9:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2012/06/25/11785/the-top-5-
reasons-why-s-b-1070-damages-america/ [https://perma.cc/2GNK-TPA7].
79 Id.
8 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394.
81 Id. at 394-95.
8 Id. at 394.
83 Id. at 388.
m See generally id.
5 Id. at 412-13.
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foreign policy with respect to those realities."86 The Court affirmed
its traditional view that the federal government is granted
inherent powers over immigration as an extension of its exclusive
powers in foreign policy.87 That is, in its immigration jurisprudence
the Court continues to rely not so much on the text of the
Constitution but on its longstanding political theory concerning
what constitutes a self-sovereign nation.88 Thus, the Court viewed
the creation of a separate immigrant residency database by
Arizona to conflict with the federal database and not as a
compliment to it.89 Moreover, the Court held that provision (4) was
preempted because being a non-resident immigrant-even without
any documentation or legal status-is not a criminal but civil
matter.90 Arizona's attempt to use police officers to enforce a civil
matter conflicted with federal immigration policy and, therefore,
preempted unless the arrest was made at the behest of federal
agents.
With respect to provision (2), the Court held that requiring
non-resident immigrants to carry residency documents on their
person was not preempted because it was not an immigration law,
but an alienage law.91 Since the provision did not come into direct
conflict with pre-existing federal immigration law or attempt to
regulate immigration status on its own, it was neither an obstacle
to or in contradiction with federal immigration law.9 2 Rather, the
Court understood it as imposing a burden upon undocumented
individuals that was not in conflict with any federal immigration
law and fit schematically within the Federal Immigration and
Reform Act of 1986.93
Scholars have argued that the Court's decision in Arizona
was a victory for continued federal predominance in immigration,
94
and that it is a win for enhanced state immigration powers.95 The
86 Id. at 397.
8 Id. at 395.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 400-03.
9 Id. at 396.
91 Id. at 414-15.
9, Id.
9: Id. at 403.
- Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 618.
5 Margaret Stock, Online Symposium: The Court Throws Arizona a Tough Bone
to Chew, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27th, 2012, 4:51 PM),
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concern, however, is the potential effect Arizona may have on the
traditional scheme used by the Court to distinguish immigration
from alienage and the implications of that change on the power of
states to legislate without being preempted by federal law. When
the smoke clears, it seems the Arizona court decided to leave the
legal distinction between immigration and alienage law relatively
unchanged; states may still legislate on issues that apply
exclusively to non-resident immigrants so long as they do not
interfere with the federal government's power to set standards of
inclusion and exclusion. If anything, the Arizona Court enlarged
the legislative powers of states concerning alienage by holding that
alienage laws seeking to promote federal immigration policies are
not automatically preempted96-at least, insofar as such laws do
not use "techniques" that interfere with those approved by
Congress. This seems to indicate that when states enact laws
consistent with federal immigration policy they are enacting
alienage laws. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how the Court could
both hold that the standard relationship between immigration and
alienage remains unchanged and that state legislation consistent
with federal immigration policy is not itself preempted in a wholly
occupied field.
http://www.scotusblogcom/2012/06/online-symposium-the-court-throws-arizona-atough-
bone-to-chew/ [https://perma.cc/39BU-DSYU.
96 This is what I take the Court's holding on provision (2) above to mean. States
may enact measures that are consistent with federal immigration law, so long as the
methods they use to enforce such laws also comply with the scheme Congress has enacted
to enforce its immigration law. However, since the Court also held tightly to the traditional
distinction between immigration law-based on the federal government's plenary powers
over foreign policy-and alienage law, based on the police powers granted to the state
governments. There are two possible ways to understand the Court's move here. Under one
interpretation, states are actually permitted to make laws concerning immigration so long
as those laws are identical or sufficiently consistent with existing federal laws. If they differ
such laws would automatically be preempted. The second possible interpretation is that the
Court is effectively construing any state law that is identical to or sufficiently consistent
with an existing federal immigration law as an alienage law. Under this second
interpretation, the court would effectively expand a state's lawmaking power by allowing it
make alienage law that actually functions as immigration law. The second interpretation
is, to me at least, the easiest way to read provision (2) since it is consistent with the federal
government's plenary power over immigration as well as the traditional power of the states
to legislate alienage. That is to say, the Court has expanded the powers of the state to make
alienage law that looks like immigration law so long as it sufficiently mimics existing federal
immigration law. Such an interpretation preserves the traditional powers of both entities.
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III. ALIENAGE AFTER ARIZONA
AND SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS
As previously mentioned, the Arizona Court viewed the
federal power over immigration law as emanating from its power
over foreign policy.97 Further, the Court did not contend that the
same power is at work concerning alienage law: the power to
promulgate alienage law does not come from the power over foreign
policy. Instead, alienage law emerges from state police power, as
well as that of the federal government. One way to conceptually
distinguish the domain of alienage and immigration law is to ask
whether a law has a relationship to the management of foreign
policy. This distinction helps further clarify the Arizona Court's
holding that state alienage laws can also be used to enforce federal
immigration policy so long as such laws do not use techniques or
methods inconsistent with federal enforcement policy.98 For
agriculturally rich states wishing to protect their non-resident
immigrant workforce, it is clear that recent court decisions either
support the stable relationship between immigration and alienage
law or, perhaps, enhance the power of states to enact protective
alienage laws. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on alienage
approves of state power and demonstrates that it is unlikely to find
federal immigration law preempts such efforts as long as they do
not interfere with the setting of standards for inclusion and
exclusion.9 9
Courts are now facing another issue related to the balance
of power between states and the federal government when it comes
to immigration: whether promulgating alienage laws that tend to
make enforcement of federal law more difficult will incur the wrath
of the courts. Such an issue is seen most clearly in cities and states
that refuse to comply with federal immigration policy, so-called
"sanctuary cities" or "sanctuary states."10 The number of
sanctuary jurisdictions is estimated to be somewhere around
a' Arizona, 567 U.S. at 397.
98 Id. at 406.
99 Id. at 399-401.
I- See Bryan Griffith & Jessica Vaughan, Maps: Sanctuary Cities, Countries, and
States, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, (July 27, 2017), https://cis.org[Map-Sanctuary-
Cities-Counties-and-States [https://perma.ccfWE54-2YVC] (offering a limited but working
definition of a sanctuary jurisdiction).
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300.101 There is no current legal definition of a sanctuary city or
state, but for the purposes of this Note, they merely stand as
jurisdictions attempting to actively thwart federal immigration
policy by either mandating non-compliance with federal
immigration law by local government officials or, in some cases, by
local private employers. Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions
attempted to define sanctuary jurisdictions as those that "violate
a federal law requiring local and state governments to share
information with federal officials about immigrants' citizenship or
legal status."102 At a minimum, a sanctuary jurisdiction must
refuse to comply with information requests from federal
immigration officials.
A sanctuary jurisdiction is different from the policy
approach favored here, which calls for the protection of non-
resident agricultural workers. Rather than enacting alienage laws
that may attempt to thwart federal immigration policy in spirit,
sanctuary jurisdictions refuse to comply with federal immigration
policy outright.0 3 It stands to reason then, the legal challenges
that the alienage law explained here will be similar to those faced
by sanctuary jurisdictions. Moreover, it is likely that those
jurisdictions will face more severe legal challenges since they
directly defy federal immigration policy. Judging an alienage law
approach may be accomplished by examining the success of legal
challenges to sanctuary jurisdictions. If sanctuary jurisdictions are
able to survive these challenges, then the alienage law approach is
likely to survive the most obvious lines of attack.
To date, sanctuary jurisdictions have proven remarkably
resilient in the face of federal action attempting to force them to
comply through Congress's "Spending Power."0 4 Article 1, Section
8, Clause 1 of the Constitution states that the federal government
has the power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
101 Kopan, supra note 8.
102 Maria Sacchetti & Sari Horwitz, Sessions Memo Defnes Sanctuary Cities -
and Hints that the Definition May Widen, WASH. POST, (May 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/locallsocial-issues/sessions-memo-defines-sanctuary-
cities--and-hints-that-the-definition-may-widen/20 17/05/22/68f8c9ec-3fla- 1 1e7-9869-
bac8b446820a story.html?utm term=.cc334a293883 [https://perma.cc/3254-694S].
103 Griffith & Vaughan, supra note 100.
04 See, e.g., Sam Levin, Trump's Order to Restrict Sanctuary Cities' Funding
Blocked by Federal Judge, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2017, 4:37 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/25/trump-sanctuary-cities-funding-
executive-order-blocked [https://perma.cc/LPB3-S5WD].
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Excises, to pay the Debts, and provide for the common Defense and
general Welfare of the United States ..."105 This clause has been
understood to give Congress not only the power to distribute funds
to the several states but also to "attach conditions on the receipt of
federal funds."106 The most obvious route for a Congressional
attempt to compel sanctuary jurisdictions to comply with federal
immigration law is to attach requirements to the receipt of federal
funds requiring such compliance.
However, in its jurisprudence surrounding the spending
power, the Supreme Court has been clear that Congress does not
have total discretion to attach whatever kind of restrictions it
wishes onto the receipt of federal funds. In South Dakota v. Dole,
the Court provided some requirements Congress must meet in
order to impose restrictions on a state's ability to receive federal
funds.07 Most important for the argument here, though, is that
Congress may not make "financial inducements" to states that are
"so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into
compulsion."'108 That is, Congress cannot place so onerous a
condition to state funding as to constitute coercion. The restriction
against coercion through restriction was reinforced by the Court in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
explaining that the attachment of federal funding to the
requirement that states open and operate a health care exchange
would permit "the Federal Government to force the States to
implement a federal program would threaten the political
accountability key to our federal system."109 That is, the more
severe and substantial the attached penalties are, the more
coercive the courts are likely to find that requirement and the more
likely it will be invalidated as an overreach of the Congressional
spending power.110 This was precisely the rationale used by U.S.
District Court Judge William Orrick III when President Trump
'os U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 1.
-0 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
1o7 Id. at 207-08 (explaining that the inclusion of a restriction on the reception of
federal funds must: (1) be done in the pursuit of the general welfare; (2) be done
unambiguously; (3) be related to some federal interest; and, (4) not be barred by any other
provision of the Constitution).
108 Id. at 211.
109 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578 (2012).
110 Id.
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attempted to cut off funds from certain sanctuary cities in 2017.111
However, if Congress cannot successfully punish such jurisdictions
financially, jurisdictions will not likely comply with federal
immigration law.
The most obvious way for the federal government to legally
compel sanctuary jurisdictions into compliance with federal
immigration law is foreclosed, absent a change of heart in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence surrounding Congress's spending
power. It is also highly plausible that less drastic measures that
do not directly defy federal immigration law will be protected by
the same limitations on Congress' spending power.
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
As argued at the beginning of this Note, states with
agricultural economies will be substantially impacted if their non-
resident immigrant workforces are suddenly deported or leave
because they are afraid of changes in federal policy. While
sanctuary jurisdictions often defy immigration policy for moral
reasons, agriculturally rich states have the added motivation of
economic self-interest. Quite simply, if their workforces are
suddenly depleted by a change in immigration policy or
enforcement, such states are likely to suffer grave economic harm.
While such jurisdictions may choose to merely defy immigration
policy, as sanctuary jurisdictions have, they may also choose to
exercise their powers over alienage law to make it more difficult
for their non-resident agricultural workforce to come into contact
with immigration enforcement. Jurisdictions may choose to create
a specific system of laws making it possible for illegal immigrants
to lead relatively normal lives without the constant fear of
deportation.
Below are a few suggested policies that may help create a
jurisdiction-specific set of alienage law to protect non-resident
immigrants, as well as the agricultural economy to which they are
so vital. These options include a substantial benefit; they are
unlikely to be successfully challenged from a legal perspective and,
"i Bob Egelko, Judge Says Trump Can't Punish Cities Over Sanctuary City
Policies, THE S.F. GATE (Apr. 25, 2017, 9:41), http://www.sfgate.com/nation/article/Judge-
says-Trump-can-t-punish-cities-over-11098098.php [https://perma.cc/Q23X-P4F3].
IMMIGRATION OR ALIENAGE?
because it does not require open defiance of immigration law, is
unlikely to draw the same amount of controversy as a sanctuary
jurisdiction. This makes these proposals both more politically
possible in jurisdictions harboring some hostility to non-resident
immigrants and will be less likely to draw the attention and ire of
federal immigration officials. Since the ultimate goal of these
recommendations is to offer some form of protection to non-
resident and undocumented workers, and the economies of
agriculturally rich jurisdictions, the implementation of alienage
law seems a more practical strategy than outright defiance. While
only a few recommendations are included below, there is room for
jurisdictions to do more to protect themselves.
First, it may be prudent to allow non-resident immigrants
the opportunity to obtain driver's licenses and other state
identification information. Such opportunities cost the jurisdiction
little economically but mean a great deal to the non-resident. In
part, it allows them the ability to use identification to function and
live like any other person within a jurisdiction; it allows them to
set up bank accounts and receiving loans and helps to obtain
housing and schooling.112 More to the point, it may also allow non-
resident immigrants the confidence to interact with law
enforcement officers in a more relaxed manner.113 Since there is an
opportunity to obtain driver's licenses, non-resident would be able
to put themselves in compliance with the applicable insurance
requirements.114 This means they would be able to drive unafraid
of being pulled over by police-at least, with little more fear than
any other licensed and insured driver.115 Additionally, it may have
the added benefit of more drivers within the jurisdiction meeting
proper licensing requirements-including relatively minor
qualifications like eyesight and knowledge of traffic laws-making
roads safer for all drivers.116
Second, jurisdictions should make legal and statutory
information available in languages other than English and
encourage local businesses to make relevant information available
112 Spencer Garlick, License to Drive: Pioneering a Compromise to Allow
Undocumented Immigrants Access to the Roads, 31 SEATON HALL LEGIS. J. 191, 195-96
(2006).
'1 Id. at 201.
"1 Id. at 200.
115 Id. at 201.
116 Id. at 200.
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in non-English languages. This is an inexpensive measure that has
the obvious benefit of making sure non-resident immigrants are
familiar with the laws and ordinances of their respective
jurisdiction. Again, the less hostile contact non-residents have
with the jurisdiction's legal system, the better to avoid
deportation.1 1 7 Such a measure has the additional benefit of
making it easier for these immigrants to engage in commerce as
both owners and customers of businesses.
Third, jurisdictions should make sure that their state labor
laws incorporate agricultural workers-including undocumented
foreign-born workers-in its minimum wage and worker's
compensation laws. This is an especially important measure when
attempting to protect agriculturally rich states' economies by
securing its undocumented workforce. In order to provide a steady
level of workers, jurisdictions should attempt to ensure that their
undocumented agricultural workers are paid an amount that
allows them to live at a reasonable level, which is important for at
least two reasons. First, it ensures that such a jurisdiction remains
attractive to undocumented workers as against competing
jurisdictions. Second, such a measure is likely to reduce the
incentive for non-resident immigrants to engage in illegal
activities to supplement their income. Such a measure then
furthers the goal of keeping these workers from being deported
because of avoidable entanglements with the jurisdiction's legal
system. This goal has been the subject of intense debate in New
York state and should be seriously considered in other like-minded
jurisdictions.1 1 8
Further, such protections arguably provide for more stable
undocumented immigrant communities by offering the financial
means to establish long-term "roots" within the local
jurisdiction.1 1 9 For instance, if undocumented workers are
"1 Susan Shah, Insha Rahman & Anita Khashu, Overcoming Language Barmiers:
Solutions for Law Enforcement, VERA INST. OF JUST. REPORT, 4 (2007).
https://www.lep.gov/resources/vera translatingjustice-final.pdf [https://perma.ce/LGV3-
JC3D ].
118 S. S02721, 199th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011),
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default-fld=&bn=S0272 1&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Text
=Y&Votes=Y [https://perma.cc/SCC6-FAVD].
119 Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, The Effect of Minimum Wages on
Immigrants' Employment and Earnings (Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas, Res. Dep't. Working
Paper No. 0805, 2008),
IMMIGRATION OR ALIENAGE?
adequately compensated, have attained the necessary
identification, and have the required paperwork available to them
in their language, they are arguably more likely to purchase
homes, invest, and start businesses within the jurisdiction. This
would lead to a more stable agricultural workforce. Additionally,
providing some jurisdiction-specific form of worker's compensation
would lessen the need for undocumented workers to try to use
federal programs or benefits, which may lead to violations of
federal immigration law. Policies such as this one would serve the
purpose of using alienage law to remove undocumented
individuals from situations in which they may be deported.
The recommendations above are merely preliminary,
ultimately arguing that there is much more jurisdictions could do
through their alienage laws to ensure some level of protection for
their undocumented workers.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence up to
Arizona created a large sphere for both the states and the federal
government to legislate concerning alienage. Moreover, states can
enact laws that affect undocumented non-residents without
entering into the preempted sphere of immigration if they, do not
attempt to set standards for inclusion or expulsion. Further, in
Arizona, even forays into immigration law are not preempted if
they seek to advance federal immigration policy through methods
or techniques approved by that policy-implicitly enlarging the
sphere of state power over alienage. Finally, we have seen that
there is little Congress can do through the Spending Clause to
compel jurisdictions to act, especially if there is little Congress can
do to compel compliance from jurisdictions in direct defiance of
federal immigration law. All of this points to the conclusion that
states wishing to protect their undocumented agricultural
workforces have considerable latitude, primarily through changes
to alienage laws. There are several policy possibilities those
jurisdictions could adopt, such as licensing opportunities and the
elimination of language barriers. Such jurisdictions may do much
https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economists/~/media/documents/research/papers/
2 0 0 8/w
p0805.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD55-QR3X].
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more than suggested, and it is recommended they explore
protective policies to the fullest extent of their alienage powers.
